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The allocation of free allowances for firms belonging to the carbon leakage
list of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) was found
to lead to substantial overcompensation, which is why some stakeholders re-
cently have called for a phasing out of free allowances in the near term. This
paper analyzes the consequences of phasing out free allowances in a dynamic
two-period model when one group of countries unilaterally implements cli-
mate policies such as an emissions trading scheme. A carbon price induces
firms to invest in abatement capital, but may also lead to the relocation
of some firms. The social planner addresses the relocation problem by of-
fering firms transfers, i.e. free allowances, conditional on maintaining the
production in the regulating country.
If transfers are unrestricted in both periods, then the social planner can
implement the first best by setting the carbon price equal to the marginal en-
vironmental damage and using transfers to prevent any relocation. However,
if transfers in the future period are restricted, it is optimal to implement a
declining carbon price path with the first period price exceeding the marginal
environmental damage. A high carbon price triggers investments in abate-
ment capital and thus creates a lock-in effect. With a larger abatement cap-
ital stock, firms are less affected by carbon prices in the future and therefore
less prone to relocate in the second period where transfers are restricted.
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1. Introduction
In a globalized world with mobile capital, unilateral climate policy by a group of countries
may have adverse effects known as carbon leakage. As the pricing of carbon dioxide
(CO2) raises the production costs of firms in the cooperating countries, these firms
lose competitiveness relative to their foreign competitors and may relocate to countries
with laxer environmental regulations. The relocation involves severe welfare losses to
the regulating countries and is associated with a loss of employment, which is why the
design of climate policy should account for the relocation problem.
In practice, several instruments have been implemented to address the adverse effects
of unilateral climate policy out of which the allocation of free emission allowances is
the most prominent one. For instance, the European Union Emissions Trading Sys-
tem (EU ETS), the largest trading scheme for CO2 emission allowances in the world,
allocates a specified amount of allowances free of charge to firms that are deemed to
be exposed to relocation. However, Martin et al. (2014) find that the current practice
leads to windfall profits and substantial overcompensation for the regulated firms. That
is why some stakeholders have called for a phasing out of free allowances at the latest
stakeholder consultation of the EU.1 This paper analyzes in a stylized dynamic model
the consequences of free allowances to be phased out in the near term and derives the
implications for the optimal inter-temporal carbon price structure.
At the 21st meeting of the Conference of the Parties in December 2015 in Paris, the
representatives of 195 countries agreed on a worldwide treaty that aims to reduce CO2
emissions substantially as suggested by the IPCC (2014). In particular, the Paris Agree-
ment calls for ’holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2◦C
above pre-industrial levels and to pursue efforts to limit the temperature increase to
1.5◦C above pre-industrial levels’ (UNFCCC 2015: Art. 2a). In order to achieve this
worldwide goal, each country individually has put forward its emissions reduction tar-
get known as nationally determined contribution (NDC). However, according to Jeffery
et al. (2015), these pledges vary substantially across countries. While only 5 out of 32
analyzed countries made pledges that are in line with the 2◦C target, the pledges of 16
countries are rated as inadequate, meaning that global warming is likely to exceed 3-4◦C
if all governments had committed to similar efforts. When implementing the NDCs by
national policies, it can be expected that the heterogeneity of efforts translates into dif-
1During the stakeholder consultation regarding the carbon leakage list organized by the EU in 2014,
61 % of civil stakeholders consider the allocation of free allowances as problematic. In particular,
environmental NGOs such as Climate Action Network, Greenpeace and Worldwide Fund for Nature
would like to replace free allowances by full auctioning in the next trading period.
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ferent carbon prices across countries, implying the relocation problem to persist despite
the Paris Agreement.
In the EU ETS, the major instrument to address relocation is the allocation of free al-
lowances. Allocating allowances free of charge attenuates the negative impact of carbon
pricing on firms’ profits, reducing the incentive to relocate. In the third trading phase
from 2013 to 2020, the EU ETS switched from allocating free allowances according to
historical emissions (grandfathering) to output-based allocation (benchmarking accord-
ing to best-available technology), where firms get a specified share of a sector-specific
benchmark. The benchmark reflects the emissions of the 90% most efficient installation
within each sub-sector that is necessary to produce one unit of the respective final good.
While in 2013, firms got 80% of this benchmark, this share is going to drop to zero by
2027.2
The EU ETS addresses carbon leakage explicitly by the carbon leakage list which
includes ’energy-intensive sectors or sub-sectors that have been determined to be exposed
to significant risks of carbon leakage’ (EU 2009: Directive 2009/29/EC, Article 10b, 1).
Sectors qualify for this list if the EU ETS raises the production costs by at least 5% and
if the trade intensity with third countries exceeds 10%.3 In addition, sectors belong to
the carbon leakage list when either the production costs increase by more than 30% due
to the EU ETS or the trade intensity is above 30%.4 The carbon leakage list is to be
updated every five years starting in 2009.5 In contrast to all other firms, firms in sectors
belonging to the carbon leakage list receive 100% of the benchmark emissions free of
charge until the end of the third phase in 2020.6 There is an ongoing debate concerning
the rules applying for these sectors beyond 2020. While representatives of the industry
have expressed their wish to continue the allocation free of charge in a first stakeholder
meeting, the majority of civil society respondents prefers phasing out or restricting the
amount of free allowances.7 This paper contrasts both scenarios and derives implications
for the optimal carbon price path.
The research question has been partially addressed in the scientific literature by Mæs-
tad (2001) and Schmidt and Heitzig (2014). Mæstad (2001) derives the optimal levels
of a set of policy instruments, which includes import tariffs, emissions taxes and local-
2EU (2009): Directive 2009/29/EC, Article 10a, 11.
3Ibid, Article 10a, 15.
4Ibid, Article 10a, 16.
5Ibid, Article 10a, 13.
6Ibid, Article 10a, 12.
7In the first stakeholder consultation ’some 29% of civil society respondents expressed their preference
for no more free allocation after 2020, while 25% believe the share of allowances dedicated to carbon
leakage and competitiveness should be lower than in 2013-2020’ (EC 2014, p.9).
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ization subsidies (formally equivalent to free allowances) when firms may relocate to a
non-regulating country. Schmidt and Heitzig (2014) show in a dynamic setting that the
temporary allocation of free allowances is sufficient to induce firms to produce in the
regulating country permanently. While Mæstad (2001) uses a static setting, Schmidt
and Heitzig (2014) focus on the analysis of the cost-minimal inter-temporal allocation
of free allowances for a given carbon price. The present paper fills in the research gap
by analyzing the implications for the optimal climate policy in a dynamic setting when
free allowances may or may not be restricted in the future.
In a two-period model with two countries, one country unilaterally implements carbon
prices in both periods to account for the damage from global warming. Carbon pricing
induces domestic firms to invest in abatement capital at the beginning of the first period
to reduce their actual emissions. However, in order to avoid carbon pricing, some firms
may relocate to the other country before or after the first period at a fixed and firm
specific relocation cost. The social planner addresses the relocation problem by a second
policy instrument, namely by offering transfers, i.e. free allowances, to the firms contin-
gent on the firm producing in the regulating country in the respective period. Depending
on the carbon prices and transfers in the two periods, firms choose the profit maximizing
location plan already at the beginning of the first period, meaning that firms choose to
either relocate immediately, after the first period or never.
If transfers are unrestricted in both periods, then the social planner can implement
the first best by setting carbon prices equal to the marginal environmental damage and
averting relocation entirely through transfer payments. This is equivalent to the result
of Mæstad (2001) in a static setting.
When the regulator has committed to restrict the allocation of free allowances in
the second period, the first best may not be feasible anymore. In the second best, the
social planner can avert any immediate relocation by offering sufficiently high first period
transfers. However, this entices some firms to play a ‘take the money and run’-strategy,
collecting transfers in the first period, but relocating thereafter. In order to prevent
delayed relocation, the social planner increases the first period carbon price above the
marginal environmental damage. This induces firms to invest more in abatement capital,
thereby creating a lock-in effect. A high abatement capital stock attenuates the negative
impact of the carbon price in the future on firms’ profits, making relocation less likely.
Thus, by raising the first period carbon price above and lowering the second period price
below the marginal environmental damage, the social planner increases the number of
firms that permanently produce in the regulating country.
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1.1. Related literature
The relocation problem forms one part of the literature on the strategic location decision
of firms under asymmetric environmental regulation between countries known as the pol-
lution haven effect (Copeland and Taylor (1994)).8 While Brunnermeier and Levinson
(2004) report that most papers in the empirical literature find no evidence for the pol-
lution haven effect, more recent papers, that use more advanced estimation techniques
and data sets, find some - though small - evidence (Xing and Kolstad (2002), List et al.
(2003), Kellenberg (2009), Dong et al. (2012) and Naughton (2014)), concluding that
unilateral environmental regulation shifts investment flows abroad. For the EU ETS,
Martin et al. (2014) explicitly analyze the effect of allocating free allowances on relo-
cation. Theoretically, efficient allocation of allowances requires the marginal relocation
risk weighted by the damage of relocation to be equal across all firms. Using firm-level
data that allows for eliciting the marginal relocation propensity of firms under the EU
ETS, Martin et al. (2014) find that the current allocation of permits results in substan-
tial overcompensation, which serves as the major argument to phase out the allocation
of free allowances.
The theoretical literature on endogenous plant location can be broadly separated into
three strands. While the first strand deals with the strategic interaction of governments
when determining environmental regulation (Markusen et al. (1995), Rauscher (1995),
Hoel (1997), Ulph and Valentini (2001) and Greaker (2003)), the second strand analyzes
the impact of environmental regulation on the location decision of the firm (Motta and
Thisse (1994), Ulph and Valentini (1997)). This paper is related to the third strand,
that normatively derives the optimal level of a predetermined set of policy instruments
(Markusen et al. (1993), Hoel (1996), Petrakis and Xepapadeas (2003), Pollrich and
Schmidt (2014) and Ikefuji et al. (2015)). The papers closest to the present one are
Mæstad (2001) and Schmidt and Heitzig (2014).
In a static setting with two countries, Mæstad (2001) analyzes three policy instru-
ments, namely an import tariff or export subsidy on the final good, an emissions tax
and a localization subsidy. He shows that the welfare maximum requires the emissions
tax to be equal to the marginal environmental damage, the import tariff to be set such
that the marginal social costs of production are equalized across both countries and the
localization subsidy to be positive. Without taking import tariffs into consideration, the
present paper derives the same result in a dynamic setting when localization subsidies
8Taylor (2005) distinguishes between the pollution haven effect according to which tightening environ-
mental standards leads to a shift of investments towards countries with laxer environmental regulation
and the pollution haven hypothesis where abolishing trade barriers causes the shift of capital flows.
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or transfers are unrestricted in the future. In an extension, Mæstad (2001) derives the
optimal emissions tax in the absence of transfers and finds that this tax should be below
the marginal environmental damage. This reflects the trade-off between the relocation of
some firms and the distortion of the abatement decisions of the remaining firms, which
is also found in this paper. In contrast to his static setting, the present paper uses a dy-
namic model which allows for deriving the optimal tax and transfer levels when transfer,
i.e. free allowances, are not phased out immediately, but in the middle term.
Schmidt and Heitzig (2014) use a dynamic model with infinite time horizon and show
that also temporary grandfathering schemes can avert the relocation of one firm perma-
nently. While the carbon price triggers investments in abatement capital, free allowances
prevent instantaneous relocation. For a fixed carbon price, the social planner averts the
relocation of the firm for a sufficiently long time horizon by allocating free allowances.
This increases the investment in abatement capital and creates a lock-in effect. Thus,
the firm will also not relocate in the long run after the provision of free permits has
ceased because a large abatement capital stock reduces the negative impact of carbon
pricing on the firm’s profit. While Schmidt and Heitzig (2014) focus on the cost minimal
inter-temporal allocation of free allowances to avert the relocation of the firm for a given
carbon price, the present paper normatively derives the optimal dynamic carbon prices
and transfers when free allowances may or may not be phased out in the future. In
addition, Schmidt and Heitzig (2014) analyze a one-firm setting. This does not allow
for identifying the basic trade-off of the present paper, i.e. the trade-off between the
relocation of some firms and the efficiency of the abatement decisions of the remaining
firms.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and
presents the objective functions of the firms and the social planner. Section 3 contrasts
the case where free allowances are available in both periods to the case of phasing out free
allowances in the second period and derives the optimal carbon prices for both cases.
Section 4 extends the model by introducing a budget constraint for the government.
Finally, Section 5 concludes and discusses the results.
2. The model
In a deterministic two-period model with two countries A and B, country A introduces a
carbon price while country B does not. The model abstracts from discounting within and
between the periods, setting the discount factor equal to one. All consumers permanently
reside in country A and all firms are initially located in country A, but may relocate
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to country B. There is neither market entry nor market exit. In each period, each firm
produces one unit of the final good whose price is normalized to 1.9 The production of
the good causes baseline emissions ¯. Firms can reduce their actual emissions by short-
term abatement as well as investments in abatement capital. Short-term abatement,
e.g. the use of less carbon-intensive, but costlier fossil fuels, reduces emissions by the
amount q in the respective period and is associated with time-invariant abatement costs
γ(q) with γ′(q) > 0 and γ′′(q) > 0.10 Investments in abatement capital take place before
period 1 and include the adoption of less carbon-intensive production technologies that
reduce actual emissions by the amount k in both periods. Investment costs κ(k) are
assumed to be convex with κ′(k) > 0 and κ′′(k) > 0. Moreover, the investment cannot
be transferred to country B when a firm relocates after having invested.11 Short-term
abatement and investments in abatement capital are assumed to be independent of each
other, i.e. they are additively separable. Finally, it is assumed that γ′(0) = 0 and
κ′(0) = 0 to avoid corner solutions and that baseline emissions are sufficiently large such
that actual emissions ¯− q − k are always positive.12
Firms may evade carbon pricing by relocating to country B, which causes relocation
costs θ. The cost parameter θ reflects the investments necessary to install the production
capacities in country B. Since those investments vary across different industries, firms are
assumed to be heterogeneous with respect to θ with θ ∼ UNI[θ, θ]. While the parameter
θ is private information of the firm, the regulator knows the distribution of θ.
Since θ is private information, the regulator makes use of uniform policy instruments.
These instruments include carbon prices in the first and second period (p and P )13 and
transfers (or localization subsidies) g and G that are conditional on the firm operating
in country A. Amundsen and Scho¨b (1999) show that there is a one to one relationship
between carbon taxes and caps in a cap-and-trade system, provided that firms are not
9Implicitly, each firm is a monopolist, facing an inverse demand function that is a step function, where
the price equals 1 up to the quantity of 1 and drops to 0 afterward. By assuming this, it can be
abstracted from any loss of competitiveness due to carbon taxation, which allows for focusing on the
interaction between relocation and carbon pricing.
10In the following, f ′(·) and f ′′(·) denote the first and second derivative of the function f(·) with respect
to its argument.
11This assumption is not crucial for the results, but makes the subsequent analysis more tractable.
Implicitly, it is assumed that the new technology cannot be transferred to country B at zero costs,
implying the relocating firm to have no incentive to install the more efficient technology in country
B.
12If actual emissions were negative, firms would benefit from carbon pricing and thus would never
relocate to country B. Alternatively, I could assume that lim
q→(1/2)¯
γ′(q) =∞ and lim
k→(1/2)¯
κ′(k) =∞
in order to guarantee actual emissions to be positive.
13In the following, lower case letters always refer to variables in the first and capital letters to variables
in the second period.
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allowed to bank or borrow emission allowances between the periods.14 Since all firms are
assumed to produce exactly one unit of the final good, uniform lump-sum transfers are
equivalent to allocating free allowances based on the best available technology standard
in a cap-and-trade system.15 In the analysis of Section 3, transfers are assumed to be
unlimited while the government must respect a budget constraint in Section 4. The reg-
ulator determines all policy variables at the beginning of the first period and is assumed
to be able to fully commit to them.
The model consists of two stages. In the first stage, the regulator sets the levels
of all current and future policy instruments, whereas in the second stage, the firms
simultaneously determine their abatement and location decisions. The model is solved
by backwards induction.
2.1. Decisions of the firms
Depending on the policy instruments and the relocation cost parameter θ, firms either
relocate never (AA), relocate later (AB) or relocate immediately (BB).16 The respective
profits for both periods read
piAA(p, g, P,G, k, q,Q) =1− p · (¯− k − q)− κ(k)− γ(q) + g+
1− P · (¯− k −Q)− γ(Q) +G (1)
piAB(p, g, k, q, θ) =1− p · (¯− k − q)− κ(k)− γ(q) + g + 1− θ (2)
piBB(θ) =1− θ + 1 (3)
where 1 denotes the revenue of the firm from selling the good in each period. While AA-
firms face carbon prices in both periods, AB-firms do so only in period 1 and relocate
thereafter. For a given location plan, firms maximize their profits with respect to the
short-term abatement, and the first-order conditions (FOC)s are given by
14If banking and borrowing was allowed, then carbon prices would equalize across the periods due to
the arbitrage of firms, preventing the regulator from differentiating carbon prices across periods by
setting the caps accordingly.
15In principle, the regulator may prevent firms from relocating by implementing an import tariff based
on the carbon content of the final good. However, since this option requires to determine the carbon
content of each final good, it seems to be hardly feasible to put into practice, which is why this model
abstracts from the use of border carbon adjustment. In addition, there is an ongoing debate which
questions the compatibility of border carbon adjustments with WTO law. See e.g. Fischer and Fox
(2012).




=p− γ′(q) !=0 (4)
∂piAB(·)
∂q
=p− γ′(q) !=0 (5)
∂piAA(·)
∂Q
=P − γ′(Q) !=0. (6)
Firms choose their short-term abatement such that the marginal abatement costs equal
the carbon price. The FOCs (4), (5) and (6) implicitly define the optimal short-term
abatement quantities q∗AA(p) = q
∗
AB(p) > 0 as well as Q
∗
AA(P ) > 0 for strictly posi-
tive carbon taxes, where all quantities increase in their arguments.17Depending on the
location plan, the FOCs for the investment in abatement capital read
∂piAA(·)
∂k
=p+ P − κ′(k) !=0 (7)
∂piAB(·)
∂k
=p− κ′(k) !=0. (8)
Equations (7) and (8) implicitly define the abatement capital stocks k∗AB(p) > 0 and
k∗AA(p + P ) ≥ k∗AB(p) with strict inequality for P > 0. The capital stocks of both firm
types are increasing in the carbon prices.18 Even though an AB-firm plans to relocate
after the first period, it invests some amount in abatement capital, thereby optimally
responding to the first period carbon price. However, the investments of AA-firms are
higher since they face the carbon price also in the second period. Note that for the
investment decision of AA-firms, only the sum of the carbon prices over both periods










AA(p+P ) into equations (1)
and (2) yields pi∗AA(p, g, P,G) and pi
∗
AB(p, g, θ), which only depend on the heterogeneity
parameter θ and the policy instruments. From equations (1) and (3) it follows immedi-
ately that pi∗AA(p = 0, g = 0, P = 0, G = 0) ≥ piBB(θ), meaning that firms keep producing
permanently in country A in the absence of any climate policy. Otherwise, they would
already have relocated before. Figure 1 depicts the profits of the firms with different
location plans depending on their relocation costs θ for g = G = 0 and p = P > 0.
17Using the implicit functions theorem leads to q∗AA
′(p) = q∗AB
′(p) = 1/γ′′(q) > 0 and Q∗AA
′(P ) =
1/γ′′(Q) > 0.
18Using the implicit functions theorem yields k∗AB
′(p) = 1/κ′′(k) > 0 and k∗AA
′(p+ P ) = 1/κ′′(k) > 0.
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For positive carbon prices and low relocation costs (θ), the profit of BB-firms is the
highest. However, this profit is declining in the relocation costs. Relative to BB-firms,
the profit line of AB-firms is a parallel shift downwards because they incur the same
relocation costs, but face carbon costs in the first period. The profit line of AA-firms is
a horizontal line because they do not incur any relocation costs.
Firms choose the location plan which yields the highest profit. In Figure 1, all firms
with θ ∈ [θ; θBBAA ) relocate immediately while all firms with θ ≥ θBBAA produce permanently
in country A.
The profit lines of AA- and AB-firms depend on the policy instruments. The policy
instruments of the second period only affect the profits of AA-firms, i.e. their profit line
shifts upwards when G increases or P decreases, implying the number of AA-firms to
rise. Increasing p reduces the profits of both AA- and AB-firms. Higher transfers g shift
both profit lines upwards by the same amount. This situation is depicted in Figure 2.
In Figure 2, increasing g induces some firms to switch from location plan BB to
location plan AA so that all firms with θ ≥ θABAA prefer location plan AA. However,
firms with θ ∈ [θ, θABAA ] relocate after the first period and are thus pursuing a ’take the
money and run’-strategy. They benefit from transfers in the first period but relocate
thereafter. Thus, first period transfers only induce firms to keep producing permanently
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in country A up to a certain point. Beyond this point, any further increase of g does
not augment the number of AA-firms, but only replaces BB-firms by AB-firms. The
indifference points θABAA and θ
BB
AA are given by
θABAA(p, P,G) =p · (k∗AB(p)− k∗AA(p+ P ))− (κ(k∗AB(p))− κ(k∗AA(p+ P )))+ (9)
P · (¯−Q∗AA(P )− k∗AA(p+ P )) + γ(Q∗AA(P )) +G
θBBAA (p, g, P,G) =p · (¯− q∗AA(p)− k∗AA(p+ P )) + γ(q∗AA(p)) + κ(k∗AA(p+ P )) + g+
P · (¯−Q∗AA(P )− k∗AA(p+ P )) + γ(Q∗AA(P )) +G. (10)
Note that θABAA(p, P,G) does not depend on g because the first period transfer affects the
profits of AA- and AB-firms by the same amount. Table 1 summarizes the properties of
the indifference points by reporting the signs of the partial derivatives with respect to
the policy instruments.
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Table 1: Properties of Indifference Points
Indifference point Condition ∂θ(·)/∂p ∂θ(·)/∂g ∂θ(·)/∂P ∂θ(·)/∂G
θABAA(p, P,G) piAA(·) = piAB(·) - 0 + -
θBBAA (p, g, P,G) piAA(·) = piBB(·) + - + -
Note that, for instance, ∂θABAA(·)/∂p = k∗AB(·) − k∗AA(·) < 0 implies the number of
AA-firms to be increasing in p.
2.2. Social welfare
Welfare is based on the national concept of country A and is the sum of consumer
surplus, producer surplus, environmental damage and the government budget. Since the
price and quantity of the final good is constant, the consumer surplus is also constant
and can be normalized to zero. The producer surplus is given by the profits of the firms,
which are assumed to be entirely owned by citizens living in country A. Hence, carbon
taxes cannot be used as an instrument to expropriate foreign firm owners.19 Moreover,
the model abstracts from any welfare losses that may arise due to the loss of jobs when
firms relocate. Relaxing the ownership assumption or introducing welfare costs due to
unemployment would only strengthen the results of this paper. Emissions are assumed
to be a global public bad and a stock pollutant with constant marginal environmental
damage ψ.20 For simplicity, it is assumed that the damage occurs only in the long
term, meaning in the second period, which adequately reflects the basic characteristics
of global warming. Relaxing this assumption or assuming increasing instead of constant
marginal environmental damages would not alter the qualitative results of this paper,
but would complicate the analysis unnecessarily. Finally, the government budget consists
of tax revenues minus transfers made to the firms, where both are assumed to be welfare-
neutral.
19When firms are (partially) owned by foreigners, Hoel (1997) shows that carbon taxes imply a transfer
from the foreign firm owners to the government or local residents. Hence, in the presence of foreign
firm ownership, we would expect carbon taxes to be higher than in this model.
20The parameter ψ can also be interpreted as political shadow price that the citizens of the home country
accept for a marginal increase of emissions.
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The welfare contribution of firms depends on their location plan. For the three firm
types, the contributions are given by
WAA(p, P ) =2− κ(k∗AA(p+ P ))− γ(q∗AA(p))− γ(Q∗AA(P )) (11)
− ψ · (2¯− 2k∗AA(p+ P )− q∗AA(p)−Q∗AA(P ))
WAB(p, θ) =2− κ(k∗AB(p))− γ(q∗AB(p))− θ − ψ · (2¯− k∗AB(p)− q∗AA(p)) (12)
WBB(θ) =2− θ − 2ψ¯. (13)
where tax payments and transfers have canceled out. Hence, the welfare contribution
consists of the firms’ revenue, the abatement costs, the relocation costs and the envi-
ronmental damage. As long as the marginal abatement costs are below the marginal
environmental damage, i.e. as long as p ≤ ψ and P ≤ ψ, there is a clear welfare rank-
ing of firms, that is WAA(p, P ) > WAB(p, θ) > WBB(θ).
21 However, for a sufficiently
large p (or P ), this welfare ranking may alter because too high carbon prices distort
the abatement decision, leading to inefficiently high abatement levels. Relative to both
other types, AA-firms are more valuable in welfare terms because they put more effort in
internalizing the environmental damage and do not incur relocation costs. While both
AB- and BB-firms bear relocation costs, AB-firms internalize some of the environmental
damage at least in the first period, implying their welfare contribution to be higher than
that of BB-firms as long as they do not abate too much.
For the aggregated welfare, it must be distinguished between three cases. In the first
case, there is no relocation, meaning that there are only AA-firms, in the second case,
there are only AA- and BB-firms as depicted in Figure 1, and in the third case, there are
only AA- and AB-firms as depicted in Figure 2. Aggregating the welfare components
over the whole range of values for θ yields the following functions
21If AB firms were to transfer their abatement capital to country B, then the welfare contribution of
one AB firm would alter to WAB(p, θ) = 2−κ(k∗AB(p))−γ(q∗AB(p))− θ−ψ · (2¯−2k∗AB(p)− q∗AA(p)),
meaning that there would be less environmental damage because the transferred abatement capital
also lowers emissions in the second period when the firm is operating in country B. However, this
would not change any of the qualitative results since the welfare ranking would be the same.
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WAAAA (p, P ) =
∫ θ
θ
WAA(p, P ) dθ = (θ − θ) ·WAA(p, P ) (14)
WABAA (p, g, P,G, θ) =
∫ θABAA (p,P,G)
θ
WAB(p, θ) dθ +
∫ θ
θABAA (p,P,G)
WAA(p, P ) dθ (15)






WAA(p, P ) dθ (16)
The overall welfare function that characterizes all relocation scenarios finally reads
W (·) =

WAAAA (·) if piAA(p, P, g,G) ≥ piAB(p, g, θ) and piAA(p, P, g,G) ≥ piBB(θ)
WABAA (·) if piAA(p, P, g,G) < piAB(p, g, θ) and piAB(p, g, θ) ≥ piBB(θ)
WBBAA (·) if piAA(p, P, g,G) < piBB(θ) and piAB(p, g, θ) ≤ piBB(θ)
(17)
where the arguments of the functions have been partially omitted.
3. Policy analysis
This section analyzes the impact of restricting transfers, i.e. free allowances, in the second
period, as was proposed by several NGOs during the stakeholder consultations of the European
Commission, and derives optimality conditions for first and second period carbon prices. As a
reference case, the analysis starts with the case where transfers are unrestricted in both periods.
3.1. Transfers are unrestricted in both periods
Since the welfare contribution of AA-firms is higher than that of AB-firms, it is a dominant
strategy for the social planner to offer transfer payments in the second period only. By doing
this, the regulator exclusively enhances the profits of AA-firms, not running the risk to attract
firms playing a ’take the money and run’-strategy. Given that transfer payments are welfare-
neutral and its availability is unlimited, the social planner uses them in order to raise the profits
of AA-firms and to prevent all relocation for any carbon prices. Thus, by setting the second
period transfer sufficiently high, the two conditions in the first line of the welfare function (17)
are always fulfilled, implying the maximization problem to reduce to
max
p,P
WAAAA (p, P ). (18)
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=(θ − θ) · (q∗AA′(·) · (ψ − γ′(q∗AA(·))) + k∗AA′(·) · (2ψ − κ′(k∗AA(·))))
=(θ − θ) · (q∗AA′(·) · (ψ − p) + k∗AA′(·) · (2ψ − p− P )) != 0 (19)
∂WAAAA (·)
∂P
=(θ − θ) · (Q∗AA′(·) · (ψ − γ′(Q∗AA(·))) + k∗AA′(·) · (2ψ − κ′(k∗AA(·))))
=(θ − θ) · (Q∗AA′(·) · (ψ − P ) + k∗AA′(·) · (2ψ − p− P )) != 0 (20)
where the profit maximization conditions of AA-firms from equations (4), (6) and (7) have been
used. Both FOCs immediately lead to Proposition 1.
Proposition 1
If transfer payments are unrestricted in both periods, then the regulator can implement the
first best by setting the carbon prices in both periods equal to the marginal environmental
damage and using the second period transfer to prevent all relocation.
Proof. Given that q∗AA
′(·) > 0, Q∗AA′(·) > 0 and k∗AA′(·) > 0, it is easy to verify that the FOCs
(19) and (20) are fulfilled for the optimal carbon prices p = P = ψ. Suppose that p < ψ, then
we must have 2ψ − p − P < 0 in order to satisfy FOC (19). This requires that P > ψ, which
together with 2ψ − p − P < 0 cannot satisfy the FOC (20). The same holds true for p > ψ, so
that we can conclude that p = P = ψ is the only combination satisfying both FOCs.
This is the first best result.23 The Pigouvian carbon prices internalize the negative environ-
mental externality (Pigou 1920), potentially causing some relocation. The relocation problem
can be perfectly addressed by the transfers in the second period, which are chosen such that
there is no relocation. Since there are two perfect instruments to address the two negative wel-
fare effects, namely the environmental damage and the relocation of firms, the Tinbergen (1952)
rule is fulfilled. The same result was obtained by Mæstad (2001) in a static model. However, in
contrast to Mæstad, this paper can analyze the effect when transfers are restricted in the second
period which will be done in the following.
22One can show that the second order conditions for a maximum, i.e. a negative definite Hessian,
are satisfied provided that the third derivatives of the abatement cost functions γ(q) and κ(k) are
sufficiently small. This holds true for a wide range of frequently applied cost functions, in particular
for quadratic ones where the third derivatives are zero. In the following, I assume that this condition
is fulfilled, so that we have a global maximum.
23Note that this is only the first best from a national welfare perspective. Since the environmental
damage of the foreign country is not taken into account, the global first best may require higher
carbon prices.
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3.2. Transfers are restricted in the second period
Transfers in the second period may be restricted due to political pressure of lobby groups calling
for a reduction of free allowances. In the following, I assume that G is the highest possible
second period transfer. As before, it is a dominant strategy for the social planner to make use
of this transfer as much as possible because AA-firms are more valuable for the regulator than
AB-firms. The first period transfer g is unrestricted, implying that the regulator could avert
any immediate relocation by offering a sufficiently high g. However, as was shown by Figure 2,
increasing g only attracts firms playing a ‘take the money and run’-strategy beyond a certain
transfer level. Hence, g is an imperfect instrument to address the relocation problem adequately,
which may require the social planner to move the carbon prices away from the first best in order
to increase the number of AA-firms and thus the welfare. The regulator can implement the first
best as long as the profits of AA-firms at first best prices exceed the profit of the AB-firm with
the lowest relocation cost, i.e. as long as piAA(p = ψ, g, P = ψ, G¯) ≥ piAB(p = ψ, g, θ). This is
the case if θ is sufficiently large. If θ is not large enough, some firms will relocate later at first





WABAA (p, P, g, G¯, θ) s.t. piAB(p, g, θ) ≥ piBB(θ)
piAB(p, g, θ) ≥ piAA(p, g, P, G¯)
max
p,P,g
WBBAA (p, P, g, G¯, θ) s.t. piAB(p, g, θ) ≤ piBB(θ)
piBB(θ) ≥ piAA(p, g, P, G¯)

(21)
where the regulator takes the maximum of the result from the optimization problem of either
WABAA (p, P, g, G¯, θ) or W
BB
AA (p, P, g, G¯, θ). The Lagrangian for the first optimization problem in
(21) is given by
L = WABAA − λ
(
piBB − piAB
)− µ(piAA − piAB) (22)
where the arguments of the functions have been skipped. In the Appendix, I show that the
first derivatives of the Lagrangian with respect to p and P when taking into account the first










































Assuming µ = 0 for a moment, it follows from equation (23) that increasing p has essentially
two effects on the welfare. First, as indicated by the first term, it augments the number of AA-
firms and lowers the number of AB-firms by the same amount because θABAA decreases in p. An
increase in p reduces the profits of AB-firms more than those of AA-firms. Since the abatement
capital investments of AA-firms are relatively higher, their actual emissions are lower, which is
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why their profits do not decrease as much as those of AB-firms. Second, an increase of p alters
the abatement decisions and therefore the welfare contribution of both AB- and AA-firms as
shown by the second and third term in equation (23). From (24), increasing P impacts welfare
through the same channels, namely it decreases the number of AA-firms (first term) and alters
their abatement decisions (second term) and welfare contributions. Hence, when choosing the
carbon prices, the regulator trades off the number of AA-firms with the abatement decisions of
the firms operating in country A.
In the Appendix, I prove that FOCs (23) and (24) can only be satisfied as long as p is above
and P is below ψ. Raising p above ψ and lowering P below ψ increases the number of AA-
firms and thus the welfare. However, moving the carbon prices away from the first best distorts
the abatement decision of firms. Thus, in an interior solution the regulator exactly trades off
the welfare gain by increasing the number of AA-firms with the welfare loss that stems from
inefficient abatement decisions of AB- and AA-firms.
This qualitative result does not alter for µ > 0 which holds true if the constraint piAB(p, g, θ) ≥
piAA(p, g, P, G¯) is binding. In this case, the regulator increases p and decreases P only until there
is no relocation anymore, meaning that all firms permanently operate in country A.
Remember that AB-firms are more valuable than BB-firms in welfare terms for p ≤ ψ. How-
ever, for a sufficiently large p, this welfare relation may reverse because p > ψ leads to a distortion
of AB-firms’ abatement decision to the extent that AB-firms abate inefficiently many emissions.
If this distortion is large enough, the welfare contribution of BB-firms is larger than that of
AB-firms and the regulator chooses the solution of the second maximization problem of (21). I
show in the Appendix that the FOCs of this problem are almost equivalent to the FOCs (23)
and (24), implying the regulator to set p > ψ > P as before in order to increase the number of
AA-firms.24 In contrast to the first solution, the regulator chooses the first period transfer such
that the profit of BB-firms is marginally higher than that of AB-firms, so that there are only
AA- and BB-firms. Proposition 2 summarizes the insights.
Proposition 2
If transfer payments in the second period are restricted and it holds that θ ≥ ψ · (k∗AB(ψ)−
k∗AA(2ψ)) − κ(k∗AB(ψ)) + κ(k∗AA(2ψ)) + ψ · (¯ − k∗AA(2ψ) − Q∗AA(ψ)) + γ(Q∗AA(ψ)) + G¯,
then the regulator implements the first best by setting carbon prices equal to the marginal
environmental damage and preventing all relocation through transfers. If transfer payments
in the second period are restricted and the above inequality does not hold true, then the
regulator sets the first period carbon price above the marginal environmental damage, the
second period carbon price below the marginal environmental damage and chooses the first
period transfer depending on whether AB- or BB-firms have a higher welfare contribution.
Proof. See Appendix.
24In fact, the major difference is that the first term of both FOCs read WBB −WAA + µ instead of
WAB −WAA + µ.
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Proposition 2 displays the second best solution. Since transfers in the second period are
restricted, the regulator must rely on first period transfers to address the relocation problem.
However, the first period transfer is an imperfect instrument to induce firms to produce perma-
nently in the regulating country because it only increases the number of AA-firms up to a certain
point, but attracts firms playing a ‘take the money and run’-strategy beyond that point. Thus,
the only option for the regulator to increase the number of AA-firms is to choose a price path
according to Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 also displays the lock-in effect. Raising the first period carbon price above the
marginal environmental damage triggers higher investments in abatement capital. This reduces
the negative impact of the second period carbon price on firms’ profits, inducing some firms to
produce permanently in country A. The lock-in effect was also illustrated by Schmidt and Heitzig
(2014) in a time-continuous model with one firm. In their paper, the regulator offers transfers
for a sufficiently long time horizon, thereby increasing the investment in abatement capital of
the regulated firm and rendering relocation less attractive after transfer payments have ceased.25
While in Schmidt and Heitzig (2014) the regulator prolongs the time horizon in which the firm
receives transfers to create the lock-in effect, the lock-in effect in the present two period model
requires raising p above ψ and, at the same time, adjusting g accordingly. Moreover, Schmidt and
Heitzig (2014) analyze only one firm that finally produces permanently in country A, whereas
this paper considers a continuum of firms. This allows for deriving the optimal carbon prices
from the trade-off between the relocation of some firms and distorting the abatement decision of
the remaining firms.
Due to the distortion of the abatement decision, the regulator cannot spread the carbon prices
infinitely. Note that the distortion for AA-firms primarily originates from the decision of the
short-term abatement that depends on the carbon price in the corresponding period. Since the
optimal investment in abatement capital depends on the sum of carbon prices p+P as shown in
equation (7), this decision may not be distorted for p > ψ > P . Hence, if there was no short-term
abatement in the model, Lemma 1 summarizes the model implications.
Lemma 1
If transfer payments in the second period are restricted and if there is no short-term
abatement option, then the regulator implements the first best by setting p = 2ψ, P = 0 and
g such that there is no relocation.
Lemma 1 also holds true for other combinations of p > ψ and P < ψ as long as p + P =
2ψ and as long as there is no delayed relocation, meaning that piAA(p, g, P, G¯) ≥ piAB(p, g, θ).
In the absence of short-term abatement, any deviation of the carbon prices from ψ does not
negatively affect the welfare contribution of AA-firms, enabling the regulator to spread carbon
25A similar result is found in a setting with asymmetric information by Pollrich and Schmidt (2014),
where the regulator offers contracts consisting of emission limits and transfers to a single firm. When
the regulator cannot commit to transfers in the second period, she may optimally tighten the emission
limit in the first period to trigger investments in abatement capital, inducing the firm to produce
permanently in country A.
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prices until there is no relocation anymore. As long as p + P = 2ψ, AA-firms choose the
welfare optimal abatement capital investment so that there is no distortion with respect to the
abatement decision. Since the investment decision in abatement capital is not distorted and
there is no relocation, the regulator can implement the first best despite the fact that the second
period transfer is restricted.
So far, the analysis has assumed first period transfers to be unlimited. However, offering high
transfers to all firms may imply substantial transfers from the government to the firms which
may lead to a budget deficit of the government. One could argue that alleviating the adverse
effects of unilateral climate policy should at least be self-financing. This issue will be addressed
in the following Section.
4. Self-financing climate policy
This Section extends the analysis by introducing a budget constraint in the regulator’s maxi-
mization problem, which reflects the fact that transfers to the firms should be self-financing to
the extent that they should be entirely financed by the revenues from carbon taxation. In terms
of free allowances, the interpretation of the budget constraint becomes even clearer. In this case,
the regulator can at most give 100% free allowances to the firms. If she was to compensate the
firms more heavily by offering additional allowances, the regulator would need to take them from
another sector, which may not be fully compensated. However, in the present model such sector
does not exist, implying 100% to be the highest possible compensation rate.
In the following, it is assumed that the budget constraint must hold at least inter-temporally.
Thus, in principle, it is possible that firms receive the free allowances for both periods already in
the first or only in the second period.26 The tax revenue from either selling emissions permits
or taxing carbon reads
TAA(p, P ) = p · (¯− q∗AA(p)− k∗AA(p+ P )) + P · (¯−Q∗AA(P )− k∗AA(p+ P )) (25)
TAB(p) = p · (¯− q∗AB(p)− k∗AB(p)) (26)
for one and each AA- or AB-firm. The analysis starts with the case in which second period
transfers are unrestricted except for the budget constraint in order to contrast this case with the
restricted scenario.
4.1. Transfers are unrestricted in both periods
When transfers are unrestricted in the second period, it is the dominant strategy for the regulator
to use exclusively second period transfers since this only benefits AA-firms while not attracting
26Given that banking and borrowing is not allowed, allocating free allowances of the second period
already in the first one means that firms can sell their second period permits in the second period
regardless of whether or not they are still operating in country A. Receiving free allowances for the
first period only in the second one can be thought of as getting a rebate for carbon expenses in the
first period conditional on still operating in country A in the second period.
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AB-firms. The social planner collects the entire tax revenue from both periods and allocates
uniform transfers to all firms that are still operating in the second period in country A subject





WAAAA (p, g = 0, P,G) s.t. piAA(p, g = 0, P,G) ≥ piBB(θ)
G · (θ¯ − θ) ≤ TAA(p, P ) · (θ¯ − θ)
max
p,P,G
WBBAA (p, g = 0, P,G) s.t. piAA(p, g = 0, P,G) ≤ piBB(θ)
G · (θ¯ − θBBAA ) ≤ TAA(p, P ) · (θ¯ − θBBAA )

(27)
where the second line of each maximization problem represents the budget constraint with G ·
(θ¯−θ) and G ·(θ¯−θABAA) being the total transfer expenditures of the government. Note that since
the carbon tax payments and transfers do not differ across AA-firms, each firm gets its entire
tax refunded by the transfer if the budget constraint is binding.27 Even though firms anticipate
this refunding, it is still individually rational for each firm to abate emissions until the marginal
abatement costs equal the carbon prices.
If the budget constraint is not binding at first best carbon prices, then the regulator can
implement the first best by setting p = P = ψ. This is the case when piAA(p = ψ, g = 0, P =
ψ,G = TAA(p, P )) ≥ piBB(θ), i.e. when θ ≥ κ(k∗AA(2ψ)) + γ(q∗AA(ψ)) + γ(Q∗AA(ψ)). However, if
the budget constraint at first best prices is binding, then the transfers are not high enough so
that some firms will relocate. In this case, the regulator solves the second maximization problem












































where µ is the Lagrangian multiplier for the constraint piAA(·) ≤ piBB(θ). The first term of each
FOC represents the welfare loss caused by more relocation in response to a higher carbon price.
Relative to the FOCs (23) and (24) from Section 3, the effect of increasing carbon prices on AA-





Since the tax payments of each firm are entirely refunded, but firms increase their abatement
effort with rising carbon prices, we have
∂θBBAA
∂i − ∂TAA∂i > 0 for i = p, P , implying the number of
AA-firms to decrease.28 The second term of FOCs (28) and (29) denotes the change of the wel-
fare contribution of all firms permanently operating in country A caused by a marginal increase











= γ′(q∗AA(p))·q∗AA′(p)+κ′(k∗AA(p+P ))·k∗AA′(p+P ) >
0.
20
of the carbon price. From both FOCs, Proposition 3 follows immediately.
Proposition 3
If the government budget needs to be balanced and if transfer payments are unre-
stricted in both periods, then the regulator can implement the first best as long as
θ ≥ κ(k∗AA(2ψ)) + γ(q∗AA(ψ)) + γ(Q∗AA(ψ)). Otherwise the regulator chooses the optimal
carbon prices to be equal in both periods and to be below the marginal environmental damage.
Proof. See Appendix.
If the budget balance is binding, the regulator faces a trade-off between the relocation of some
firms and distorting the abatement decisions of firms permanently operating in country A. As a
solution, the regulator is willing to distort the abatement decision in order to prevent the reloca-
tion of some firms and therefore chooses carbon prices to be below the marginal environmental
damage. A similar result was also reported by Mæstad (2001) in a static model.29 However,
Mæstad (2001) could not analyze the following case.
4.2. Transfers are restricted in the second period
This Section deals with the case where transfers are not only restricted by the budget constraint
of the government, but second period transfers are also restricted due to political reasons. For
simplicity, the regulator is assumed to use exclusively first period transfers, meaning that G = 0.
The use of first period transfers may attract firms playing a ’take the money and run’-strategy.
Analogously to the analysis in Section 3, we focus on the more interesting case where the first





WABAA (p, P, g,G = 0) s.t. piAB(p, g, θ) ≥ piBB(θ)
piAB(p, g, θ) ≥ piAA(p, g, P,G = 0)
g · (θ¯ − θ) ≤ T (p, P )
max
p,P,g
WBBAA (p, P, g,G = 0) s.t. piAB(p, g, θ) ≤ piBB(θ)
piBB(θ) ≥ piAA(p, g, P,G = 0)
g · (θ¯ − θBBAA ) ≤ TAA(p, P ) · (θ¯ − θBBAA )

(30)
where in the first optimization problem T (p, P ) ≡ (θABAA(·)−θ)·TAB(p)+(θ¯−θABAA(·))·TAA(p, P ) is
the aggregate tax revenue when there are both AB- and AA-firms. Note that in this case, the tax
and transfer system implicitly redistributes profits from AA- to AB-firms because it allocates the
tax revenues generated from AA-firms in the second period uniformly to all firms that operate in
29In contrast to this paper, Mæstad (2001) does not assume that the transfers must be self-financing,
but analyzes a case where transfers are not available for the regulator.
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country A in the first period. As shown in the Appendix, the first derivative of the Lagrangian















































where ν is the Lagrangian multiplier for the budget constraint. The FOCs differ from the FOCs
in equation (23) and (24) only with respect to the last term that contains ν. Thus, if the budget
constraint is not binding, then we have ν = 0 and the regulator optimally chooses the second
best prices with p > ψ > P as in Proposition 2. However, if the budget constraint is binding,
the regulator needs to adjust the carbon prices. The direction of this adjustment depends on
the impact of a price increase on the aggregate tax revenue. Exemplified on the second period
carbon price, this impact is given by
∂T
∂P
= (θ¯ − θABAA)(¯−Q∗AA − k∗AA)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0













A marginal increase of P has three effects on the tax revenue which are illustrated by the
three terms in equation (33). First, it increases the tax revenue of all AA-firms by their
actual emissions. Second, it increases the short-term and long-term abatement which
reduces the tax revenues of all AA-firms. Third, it lowers the number of AA-firms and
increases the number of AB-firms, implying the aggregate tax revenue to shrink. Due
to these opposing effects, the overall effect is indeterminate.
If an increase of P augments the aggregate tax revenue, then it follows from equation
(32) that the government will raise P above the second best because this raises the
revenue, which enables the government to increase transfers to avert immediate reloca-
tion.30 However, if the opposite holds true, then the regulator chooses a third best P
which is below the second best.
Concerning the first period price, the last term of equation (31) indicates that there
are two different effects for a change in p. First, as before, a higher p either increases or
decreases the aggregate tax revenue.31 Second, increasing p also reduces the profits of
30Note that it is also possible that the social planner raises the second period price above the marginal
environmental damage in order to raise more tax revenue.
31Note that ∂T
∂p
slightly differs from equation (33) because an increase of p also impacts the tax revenues
of AB firms. However, the basic trade-offs are equivalent to those reported above.
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AB-firms, meaning that higher transfers are required to avert immediate relocation. This
effect alone would result in a reduction of p relative to the second best price. However,
the overall effect is also indeterminate because the second effect could be exceeded by a
potential increase of tax revenues from raising p provided that this increase is sufficiently
large.
For both prices it holds that departing from the second best prices increases the
welfare loss even further because it leads to more relocation and to higher distortions of
the abatement decisions. If this welfare loss is very substantial, then the social planner
may pursue a different strategy which does not aim at attracting AB-firms. In this case,
the first derivatives of the Lagrangian for the second optimization problem in (30) with























































where λ is the multiplier for the constraint piBB(·) ≥ piAB(·). If the budget constraint is not
binding, then it can be shown that the results correspond to those reported in Proposition 2.32
However, in the more interesting case when the budget constraint is binding, the social planner
may pursue two different strategies, depending on whether or not the constraint piBB(·) ≥ piAB(·)
is binding.
First, if this constraint is binding, then λ > 0 and we have a similar case as was explained
before Proposition 2. In short, since the first period carbon price distorts the abatement decisions
of AB-firms so much that WBB > WAB , the regulator uses transfers only up to the point where
the profits of AB-firms are marginally below those of BB-firms. Since the budget constraint is
binding, transfers are endogenous and depend on the carbon prices in both periods. Thus, the
regulator chooses the third best carbon prices such that there are no AB-firms. It is hard to
make any qualitative statement regarding the level of third best prices in this case because of
the different impacts on firms’ profits and tax revenues. However, equation (35) indicates that
the third best P is below ψ as long as an increase in P raises the aggregate tax revenues.
The second strategy refers to the case where the tax revenues and thus the transfers are not
large enough to attract AB-firms such that the constraint piBB ≥ piAB is not binding. In this
case, we have λ = 0 and the FOCs (34) and (35) reduce to the FOCs (28) and (29) from Section
32To see this, note that ∂L
∂g
= WAA−WBB −λ−µ+ ν. If the budget constraint is not binding, we have
ν = 0. Solving equation ∂L
∂g
= 0 for λ and plugging in into equations (34) and (35) leads to equations
(A.13) and (A.14), implying that we obtain the same results as in Proposition 2.
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4.1. Thus, the social planner trades off the relocation of some firms and the efficiency of the
abatement decisions and chooses p = P < ψ as reported in Proposition 3.
Summing up, the social planner has three pricing strategies where one includes AB- and AA-
firms while the other two focus on BB- and AA-firms. The properties of these strategies are
summarized in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4
If the government’s budget needs to be balanced, if transfer payments are restricted to zero
in the second period and if the first best and second best are not feasible, then the regulator
chooses the welfare maximizing strategy out of the strategies in Table 2 and implements the
third best prices accordingly:
Table 2: Third best strategies
Strategy Firms Price p Price P
Tax revenue increases in P
no yes
Strategy 1 AA and AB p Q ψ P Q ψ P < ψ
Strategy 2 AA and BB p Q ψ P Q ψ P < ψ
Strategy 3 AA and BB p < ψ p = P < ψ
Proof. See Appendix.
Out of the three strategies from Proposition 4, the regulator chooses the one that yields
the highest welfare level. Since a qualitative statement regarding the welfare ranking of the
strategies is not possible, the following numerical example sheds some light on the choice of the
social planner.
Numerical example
The abatement cost functions are assumed to be quadratic and given by γ(q) = (1/2)cqq
2
and κ(k) = (1/2)ckk
2. For quadratic functions, it can be shown that the welfare contribution of
AB-firms always exceeds that of BB-firms in the range of plausible carbon prices.33 Hence, it is
never optimal for the regulator to pursue strategy 2 from Proposition 4, which is why the focus
is on the remaining strategies.
Remember that strategy 1 involves a deviation from second best prices because transfers are
not sufficiently high to attract AB-firms. If the profit difference between AB-firms and BB-firms
for second best prices and the respective transfers is small, the carbon prices need to be adjusted
only slightly, implying the associated welfare loss to be rather moderate. However, if the profit
33The reason is that the welfare contribution of AB-firms WAB(p, θ) exceeds WBB(θ) as long as 0 <
p < 2ψ. Since carbon prices p + P > 2ψ distort the investment decision of AA-firms, it is never
optimal to choose p + P > 2ψ. Thus, it follows that p is always smaller than 2ψ and therefore
WAB(p, θ) > WBB(θ).
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difference is large, the regulator needs to distort the prices substantially, which leads to a sizable
welfare loss, in particular due to the loss of AA-firms. In this case, the welfare under strategy 3,
that contains exclusively AA-firms and BB-firms, may be higher.
When choosing between strategy 1 or strategy 3, the regulator faces a trade-off between
distorting the carbon prices, but attracting AB-firms and having only BB-firms, but potentially
lower carbon price distortions. The choice between both strategies depends, in particular, on
the level of the transfer and thus on the tax revenues. As was shown above, strategy 1 entails a
redistribution of profits from AA-firms to AB-firms, so that one would expect the regulator to
prefer strategy 1 over strategy 3 for high tax revenues, whereas the reverse holds true for low
tax revenues. Tax revenues are increasing in baseline emissions ¯. Assuming cq = ck = 1, θ = 0,
θ¯ = 10 and ψ = 0.5, Figure 3 depicts the welfare levels and the carbon prices for strategy 1 and
3 for ¯ ranging from 1 to 2.
Figure 3: Comparison of tax and quantity regulation
(a) Welfare (b) Prices
In the left panel of Figure 3, it can be seen that the welfare levels of both strategies are
decreasing in the baseline emissions ¯ because higher emissions cause more damage from global
warming. As was expected, for low values of ¯, the welfare from strategy 3 outweighs that of
strategy 1 whereas this relationship reverses for sufficiently large ¯. The reason for this can
be inferred from the right panel of Figure 3, which shows the carbon prices of both strategies.
While the carbon prices of strategy 3 remain constant34, those of strategy 1 start from a rather
low level for small values of ¯ and increase with higher values of ¯. If ¯ is low, so are the tax
revenues and the transfers to the firms. Thus, in order to attract AB-firms, it is necessary to
reduce p substantially relative to the second best prices. A small p implies low investments in
abatement capital which is why the regulator also wants to set P rather low in order to prevent
the relocation of too many AA-firms. Higher values of ¯ increase the tax revenues and transfers
to the firms, allowing the regulator to raise both carbon prices towards the second best. For
sufficiently large ¯, the regulator finally prefers strategy 1 over strategy 3.
34Constant carbon prices imply the abatement effort of firms to remain constant as well, causing the
welfare level of strategy 3 to decline linearly in ¯.
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5. Conclusion
This paper studied the consequences of a restriction of free allowances in the near term as
was demanded by many members of the civil society during the stakeholder consultations of
the European Commission regarding the future of the carbon leakage list within the EU ETS.
Allocating free allowances has not only distributive consequences, but also allocative implications
to the extent that it alters the profits of firms and thus their location decision.
Using a stylized two-period two-country framework with mobile firms, this paper shows that
when transfers or free allowances are unrestricted in both periods, the social planner can perfectly
address the relocation problem and implements the first best by setting carbon prices equal to
the marginal environmental damage and preventing any relocation by sufficiently high transfer
payments. However, if transfers in the second period are restricted, the first best may not be
achieved because first period transfers are an imperfect instrument for inducing firms to produce
permanently in the regulating country. For a sufficiently high first period transfer, some firms will
play a ’take the money and run’-strategy and relocate in the second period. The social planner
addresses this problem by raising the first period carbon price above the marginal environmental
damage, which creates a lock-in effect. It triggers higher investments in abatement capital,
which benefits firms permanently producing in the regulated country disproportionately more
than those that planned to relocate later. In the second best, the planner faces a trade-off between
locking some firms in and distorting the abatement decisions of firms, resulting in strictly lower
welfare levels relative to the first best.
Section 4 requires the government’s budget to be balanced. If the budget constraint is binding
and transfers in the second period are not restricted, then the regulator optimally sets both car-
bon prices to be equal and below the marginal environmental damage, trading-off the distortion
of firms’ abatement decision and the relocation pressure. If transfers in the second period are
restricted, the regulator may choose essentially between two strategies. Either she chooses the
carbon prices to be equal and below the marginal environmental damage as in the unrestricted
scenario or she attempts to attract AB-firms and sets the carbon prices accordingly.
In the case where transfers are not restricted in the second period, this paper derives the
same results as Mæstad (2001). However, since Mæstad (2001) uses a static model, he cannot
analyze the implications of phasing out free allowances in the middle term for the current and
future carbon prices and thus cannot obtain the lock-in effect. The lock-in effect was shown by
Schmidt and Heitzig (2014) in a time-continuous model with one firm. While in Schmidt and
Heitzig (2014), the regulator locks the firm in by offering transfers for a sufficiently long time
horizon which increases the investments in abatement capital and induces the firm to produce
permanently in the regulating country, the lock-in effect in this paper results from raising the
carbon price in the first period. Since in Schmidt and Heitzig (2014) there is only one firm,
they cannot derive the trade-off between the relocation of some firms and the distortion of the
abatement decision of the remaining firms, which characterizes the second and third best results
of this paper.
The policy implications of this paper are twofold. First, it argues for maintaining a high share
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of free emission allowances for energy-intensive firms that are subject to relocation and therefore
opposes the position of the stakeholders calling for a phasing out in the near term. By restricting
the share of free allowances in the future, the regulator loses one powerful instrument that per-
fectly addresses the relocation problem caused by carbon pricing. Hence, free allowances should
be maintained as long as there are substantial carbon price differences between the countries
despite a potential overcompensation of firms. In order to reduce the overallocation, this paper
suggests to narrow the allocation of free allowances to the most mobile firms, i.e. the firms with
the lowest relocation costs. The European Union partially follows this strategy in recent years
to the extent that in the third trading period of the EU ETS, local electricity producers do
not get any free allowances and that there are special provisions for firms with high relocation
risk in form of the carbon leakage list. Currently, the European Commission seems to pursue a
refinement of that list and has proposed a differentiated allocation scheme that takes the sector-
specific relocation risk into account. The second implication refers to the choice of carbon prices
(or the emissions cap) provided that free allowances are to be phased out in the near future. In
this case, the EU ETS should strive for a high carbon price in the near term in order to trigger
investments in abatement capital and to create the lock-in effect. Thus, recently implemented
measures aiming at raising the carbon price such as backloading or proposed measures such as
the introduction of a floor price go in the right direction.
For future research, this paper could be extended towards several directions. First, it may
take into account the loss of jobs that is associated with the relocation of firms and which is the
major argument in the political debate. Accounting for this would only strengthen the result of
this paper, implying unrestricted transfers to become even more important. Second, the model
could account for foreign firm ownership of domestic firms. While taxes imply a redistribution
from foreign owners to the government or local residents, transfers or free allowances work in
the other direction, meaning that there are further trade-offs that need to be considered for
the optimal tax and transfer scheme. Third, this model restricted the regulator to use uniform
taxes and transfers because firm-specific relocation costs were private information. However, the
regulator could also make use of more sophisticated tax and transfer schemes as suggested by the
mechanism design literature. The paper of Pollrich and Schmidt (2014) goes in this direction.
Using a different setting, they also conclude that the regulator should require a high first period




Amundsen, E. S. and R. Scho¨b (1999). Environmental taxes on exhaustible resources. European
Journal of Political Economy 15, 311–329.
Brunnermeier, S. B. and A. Levinson (2004). Examining the Evidence on Environmental Regu-
lations and Industry Location. The Journal of Environment & Development 13 (1), 6–41.
Copeland, B. R. and M. S. Taylor (1994). North-South Trade and the Environment. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 109 (3), 755–787.
Dong, B., J. Gong, and X. Zhao (2012). FDI and environmental regulation: pollution haven or
a race to the top? Journal of Regulatory Economics 41 (2), 216–237.
EU (2009). European Parliament and the Council of the European Union: Directive 2009/29/EC
of 23 April 2009.
European Commision (2014). Stakeholder consultation analysis: Emission Trading System (ETS)
post-2020 carbon leakage provisions.
Fischer, C. and A. K. Fox (2012). Comparing policies to combat emissions leakage: Border carbon
adjustments versus rebates. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 64 (2),
199–216.
Greaker, M. (2003). Strategic environmental policy when the governments are threatened by
relocation. Resource and Energy Economics 25 (2), 141–154.
Hoel, M. (1996). Should a carbon tax be differentiated across sectors? Journal of Public
Economics 59, 17–32.
Hoel, M. (1997). Environmental Policy with Endogenous Plant Locations. Scandinavian Journal
of Economics 99 (2), 241–259.
Ikefuji, M., J. ichi Itaya, and M. Okamura (2015). Optimal Emission Tax with Endogenous
Location Choice of Duopolistic Firms. Environmental and Resource Economics, 1–6.
IPCC (2014). Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and
III to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core
Writing Team, R.K. Pachauri and L.A. Meyer (eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland. Technical
report.
Jeffery, L., C. Fyson, R. Alexander, J. Gu¨tschow, M. Rocha, J. Cantzler, M. Schaeffer, and
B. Hare (2015). 2.7◦C is not enough - we can get lower. Technical report, Climate Action
Tracker, Berlin.
Kellenberg, D. K. (2009). An empirical investigation of the pollution haven effect with strategic
environment and trade policy. Journal of International Economics 78 (2), 242–255.
28
List, J. A., D. L. Millimet, P. G. Fredriksson, and W. W. McHone (2003). Effects of Environmen-
tal Regulations on Manufacturing Plant Births: Evidence from a Propensity Score Matching
Estimator. Review of Economics and Statistics 85 (4), 944–952.
Mæstad, O. (2001). Efficient climate policy with internationally mobile firms. Environmental
and Resource Economics 19 (3), 267–284.
Markusen, J. R., E. R. Morey, and N. Olewiler (1995). Competition in regional environmental
policies when plant locations are endogenous. Journal of Public Economics 56 (1), 55–77.
Markusen, J. R., E. R. Morey, and N. D. Olewiler (1993). Environmental Policy when Market
Structure and Plant Locations Are Endogenous. Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management 24 (1), 69–86.
Martin, R., M. Muuˆls, L. B. de Preux, and U. J. Wagner (2014). Industry Compensation under
Relocation Risk: A Firm-Level Analysis of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme. American
Economic Review 104 (8), 2482–2508.
Motta, M. and J. F. Thisse (1994). Does environmental dumping lead to delocation? European
Economic Review 38 (3-4), 563–576.
Naughton, H. T. (2014). To shut down or to shift: Multinationals and environmental regulation.
Ecological Economics 102 (0), 113–117.
Petrakis, E. and A. Xepapadeas (2003). Location decisions of a polluting firm and the time
consistency of environmental policy. Resource and Energy Economics 25 (2), 197–214.
Pigou, A. C. (1920). The Economics of Welfare. London: Macmillan and Co.
Pollrich, M. and R. C. Schmidt (2014). Unobservable investments, limited commitment, and the
curse of firm relocation. BDPEMS Working Paper Series Nr. 4, 1–49.
Rauscher, M. (1995). Environmental regulation and the location of polluting industries. Inter-
national Tax and Public Finance 2 (2), 229–244.
Schmidt, R. C. and J. Heitzig (2014). Carbon leakage: Grandfathering as an incentive device to
avert firm relocation. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 67 (2), 209–223.
Taylor, M. S. (2005). Unbundling the Pollution Haven Hypothesis. Advances in Economic
Analysis & Policy 3 (2).
Tinbergen, J. (1952). On the theory of economic policy. Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing
Company.
Ulph, A. and L. Valentini (1997). Plant location and strategic environmental policy with inter-
sectoral linkages. Resource and Energy Economics 19 (4), 363–383.
29
Ulph, A. and L. Valentini (2001). Is environmental dumping greater when plants are footloose?
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics 103 (4), 673–688.
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2015). Adoption of the Paris Agree-
ment. Paris: United Nations.
Xing, Y. and C. D. Kolstad (2002). Do Lax Environmental Regulations Attract Foreign Invest-
ment? Environmental and Resource Economics 21 (1), 1–22.
30
A. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2






























































λ(piBB − piAB) + µ(piAA − piAB) = 0 (A.4)
λ, µ ≥ 0 (A.5)




∂p − ∂piAA∂p and
∂θABAA
∂P = −∂piAA∂P immediately leads to equations (23) and (24) which are the starting points for
the proof of Proposition 2.





























WAB −WAA + µ
)∂θABAA
∂P < 0. Hence, a marginal increase
(decrease) of p (P ) raises the welfare at p = P = ψ.
Second, given that
∂θABAA
∂p < 0 and assuming for a moment that
(
WAB −WAA + µ
)
< 0, we
must have ∂WAA∂P = Q
∗
AA
′(ψ − P ) + k∗AA′(2ψ − p − P ) > 0 to satisfy equation (24). For p ≥ ψ,
this requires P to be smaller than ψ. As
(
WAB −WAA + µ
)∂θABAA
∂p > 0, we must have p > ψ
for P ≤ ψ to satisfy FOC (23). This leads to p > ψ > P . Moreover, we can exclude the case
P > ψ > p because P > ψ requires 2ψ − p − P > 0 to satisfy equation (24), whereas p < ψ
requires 2ψ − p − P < 0 to satisfy FOC (23), leading to a contradiction. Thus, we must have
p > ψ > P to satisfy both FOCs.




< 0, note that for µ > 0 we must have piAA(p, g, P, G¯) =
piAB(p, g, θ). If
(
WAB −WAA + µ
)
> 0, then we would have p < ψ < P for the same reasons
as above. But then piAA(p < ψ, g, P > ψ, G¯) = piAB(p < ψ, g, θ) implies that piAA(ψ, g, ψ, G¯) >





The Lagrangian for the second maximization problem of (21) is given by
L = WBBAA − λ
(
piAB − piBB
)− µ(piAA − piBB) (A.6)

















































λ(piAB − piBB) + µ(piAA − piBB) != 0 (A.10)
λ, µ ≥ 0 (A.11)
Since ∂piAA∂g =
∂piAB
∂g = 1 and
∂θBBAA
∂g = −∂piAA∂g = −1, it follows from equation (A.9) that
λ = WAA −WBB − µ > 0. (A.12)
In order to satisfy equation (A.10), we must have piAB = piBB , meaning that the regulator chooses
g such that firms are indifferent between relocating later or immediately. Note that piAB = piBB
implies θBBAA = θ
AB
AA . Plugging in equation (A.12) into equation (A.7) and using the facts that
∂θBBAA






















∂P = −∂piAA∂P = ∂θ
AB
AA















Equations (A.13) and (A.14) are almost equivalent to the FOCs (23) and (24). Hence, for the
same reasons as above, we must have p > ψ > P .
Proof of Proposition 3
The Lagrangian of the second maximization problem of (27) is given by
L = WBBAA − µ(piAA − piBB)− ν(G− TAA) (A.15)











































− ν != 0 (A.18)
µ(piAA − piBB) + ν(G− TAA) != 0 (A.19)
µ, ν ≥ 0 (A.20)
Taking into account that
∂θBBAA
∂G = −1 and ∂piAA∂G = 1, it follows from equation (A.18) that
ν = WAA −WBB − µ. Substituting ν in equations (A.16) as well as (A.17) and bearing in mind
that
∂θBBAA














AA) > 0. (A.21)
For the first part of Proposition 3, note that if the regulator sets the highest possible transfer
G = TAA(p, P ), then the profit of an AA firm reads pi
∗
AA(p, P, g = 0, G = TAA(p, P )) = 2 −
κ(k∗AA(p+P ))−γ(q∗AA(p))−γ(Q∗AA(P )). Thus, there is no relocation for first-best prices as long
as θ ≥ κ(k∗AA(2ψ)) + γ(q∗AA(ψ)) + γ(Q∗AA(ψ)) and the regulator can implement the first-best.




AA(ψ)), the regulator optimally

















∂i < 0 for i = p, P . Since
∂θBBAA
∂p > 0 as well
as
∂θBBAA
∂P > 0 and WBB −WAA + µ < 0, we must have ∂WAA∂p > 0 and ∂WAA∂P > 0 to satisfy the
FOCs (28) and (29). This requires p + P < 2ψ. Since the FOCs (28) and (29) are symmetric,
there is a unique welfare maximum with p = P < ψ.
Proof of Proposition 4
The Lagrangian for the first optimization problem in (30) reads
L = WABAA − λ(piBB − piAB)− µ(piAA − piAB)− ν(g(θ¯ − θ)− T ) (A.22)








+ (θABAA − θ)
∂WAB
∂p















































− ν(θ¯ − θ) != 0 (A.25)
λ(piBB − piAB) + µ(piAA − piAB) + ν(g(θ¯ − θ)− T ) != 0 (A.26)
λ, µ, ν ≥ 0 (A.27)
Taking into account that ∂piAB∂g = 1 and that
∂piAA
∂g − ∂piAB∂g = 0, equation (A.25) can be reduced
to λ = ν(θ¯− θ). Plugging this in into equation (A.23) and performing the same transformations
as in the proof of Proposition 2 leads to equation (31) from the text. For the first line in Table 2
from Proposition 4 note that the sign of the last term of equation (31) is indeterminate. Hence,
the third best p can be either above or below ψ. For the last entry in the first line, the last term
of equation (32) is certainly negative, implying the term ∂WAA∂P to be positive which holds only
true for P < ψ for the same reasons as pointed out in the proof of Proposition 2. However, if
∂T (p,P )
∂P > 0, then P can be below or above ψ.
The Lagrangian for the second optimization problem in (30) reads
L = WBBAA − λ(piAB − piBB)− µ(piAA − piBB)− ν(g − TAA) (A.28)
















































λ(piBB − piAB) + µ(piAA − piBB) + ν(g − TAA) != 0 (A.32)
λ, µ, ν ≥ 0 (A.33)
Taking into account that
∂θBBAA
∂g = −1 and ∂piAB∂g = 1, equation (A.31) reduces to ν = WAA −
WBB − λ − µ. Plugging this into equations (A.29) and (A.30) leads to equations (34) and (35)
from the text. If λ > 0, then p can be above or below ψ because the sign of the last term
in equation (34) is indeterminate which proofs the first entry in the second line of Table 2. If
∂TAA
∂P > 0, then the last term of equation (35) is negative and P must be below ψ. If the opposite
holds true, then P can be above or below ψ which proofs the other entries of the second line.
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For the last line, if λ = 0, then the FOCs (34) and (35) are equivalent to (28) and (29) and we
have p = P < ψ for the same reasons as outlined in the proof of Proposition 3.
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